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KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES: THE THIRD CIRCUIT EXTENDS THE
LAW’S REACH TO MORE JOINT EMPLOYERS, SUCCESSORS, AND
SUPERVISORS IN THOMPSON v. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK
JOHN M. D’ELIA*
“Sometimes I’d work 60, even 90 days in a row . . . . They never paid
overtime.”1
- Guadalupe Rangel
Mira Loma, California
I.

INTRODUCTION

Guadalupe Rangel spent most of his waking hours unloading products for
the largest private employer in the world—Walmart.2 Mr. Rangel worked up to
eleven hours per day and often seven days per week for months on end. 3 The
family that owns Walmart boasts a cumulative wealth greater than that of 42%
of American households combined.4 Mr. Rangel, on the other hand, alleged he
never received overtime pay after putting in seventy-hour work weeks
unloading Walmart products.5 At the warehouse where Mr. Rangel worked,
Walmart dictated the work done, determined workers’ schedules, set accuracy
and productivity standards, oversaw training programs, supervised workers,
maintained staffing reports, and created budgets for labor costs. 6 However, on
paper, Walmart was not Mr. Rangel’s employer. 7 A company called Schneider

*
J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2011, George
Washington University. This Casebrief is dedicated to Anthony J. D’Elia and his unyielding
hope in the labor and civil rights movements. Additionally, this Casebrief would not have
been possible without the love and support of my parents, John and Patricia D’Elia.
1. Steven Greenhouse, More Workers Are Claiming ‘Wage Theft’, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/business/more-workers-are-claiming-wagetheft.html [https://perma.cc/52HK-LQL5?type=source] (quoting Mr. Rangel’s account of
alleged overtime violations at Schneider Logistics warehouse where workers unloaded
products to be sold at Walmart stores).
2. See id. (describing Mr. Rangel’s account of his work schedule and responsibilities).
3. See id.
4. See Josh Bivens, Another Measure of the Staggering Wage Gaps in the United
States: Comparing Walton Family Wealth to Typical Households by Race and Ethnicity,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 13, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.epi.org/blog/measure-staggeringwage-gaps-united-states/ [http://perma.cc/3HE4-FWFH] (discussing wealth concentration in
U.S. economy by relying on data from Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances and
Forbes 400 and comparing Walton family wealth to combined wealth of U.S. households by
race and ethnicity).
5. See Greenhouse, supra note 1 (noting Mr. Rangel’s allegations of “wage theft”
brought on by working up to eleven hours per day and sometimes seventy hours per week).
6. See Memorandum of Points & Auths. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
File Third Am. Comp. at 9–10, Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., No. CV 11–8557 CAS
(DTBx) (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (arguing Walmart is joint employer of warehouse workers
at Schneider Logistics and thus is jointly and severally liable for wage and hour violations).
7. See id. (describing direct employment of workers by Schneider Logistics while
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Logistics, Inc. directly employed Mr. Rangel, and its warehouse’s only client
was Walmart.8
Generally, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) entitles employees to
receive “time and a half” pay (one and one-half the regular rate of pay) for any
hours they work in excess of forty per week, and employees can sue employers
who fail to compensate them for their overtime work. 9 In the Ninth Circuit,
where Mr. Rangel’s case unfolded, courts apply a test outlined in Bonnette v.
California Health & Welfare Agency10 to determine whether a company is a
“joint employer” of workers by virtue of its control over employment matters. 11
This “Bonnette” test empowers aggrieved workers to sue companies other than
their immediate employer for wage and hour violations when such companies
have significant influence, even indirect influence, over workers.12 Imposing
such liability empowers workers to vindicate their workplace rights in reality;
often companies without a formal employment relationship with employees
exert tremendous power over working conditions and precipitate FLSA
violations.13 When Mr. Rangel and other plaintiffs sued Schneider and
Walmart, the companies settled with the plaintiffs for $21 million dollars, which
covered 1,800 Schneider warehouse workers. 14
Walmart exerts considerable authority over workers’ terms and conditions of employment).
8. See id. at 9–10.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012) (requiring employers to compensate employees at
one and one-half rate of pay for any hours worked in excess of forty per week).
10. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. See id. at 1470 (articulating Ninth Circuit’s test for determining whether company
is joint employer of workers liable for FLSA violations, emphasizing hiring and firing
authority, supervisory authority, authority to control schedules and employment, power to set
rate and method of payment, and maintenance of employment records), disapproved by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
12. See id. at 1469–70 (stressing breadth of FLSA’s definition of “employer”—which
includes individuals acting indirectly in interest of employers—and quoting regulations by
Department of Labor, which enforces FLSA, that provide hypothetical examples of indirect
employment relationships that meet FLSA’s liberal definition, including company that
controls another company that immediately employs workers).
13. See, e.g., Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir.
2008) (finding hospital was joint employer of nurse despite that nurse was directly employed
and paid by third party agencies because “(1) [the nurse] worked on [the hospital’s] premises
using [its] equipment; (2) no referral agency shifted its employees as a unit from one hospital
to another, but instead each assigned health care workers, including [the nurse], to the same
facility whenever possible to ensure continuity of care; (3) [the nurse] performed work
integral to [the hospital’s] operation; (4) [the nurse’s] work responsibilities at [the hospital]
remained the same regardless of which agency referred her for a particular assignment; (5)
[the hospital] effectively controlled the on-site terms and conditions of [the nurse’s]
employment; and (6) [the nurse] worked exclusively for [the hospital]”), abrogation
recognized by Adorno v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The hospital in Barfield had the power to hire and fire nurses referred by agencies, although
“ultimate” authority rested with the agencies. See id. at 144. Similarly, the court observed
that the hospital exercised some influence over pay, because it effectively determined
employees’ hours and capped their pay when it set the hourly rates referral agencies would
receive. See id. at 144–45.
14. See Ricardo Lopez, Workers Reach $21-Million Settlement Against Wal-Mart,
Warehouses, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wal-mart-
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In In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices
Litigation15 (Enterprise), the Third Circuit adopted aspects of the Bonnette test
to ensure plaintiffs like Mr. Rangel may hold indirect employers accountable
for wage theft.16 As a result, companies exercising both direct and indirect
control over workers may be deemed joint employers liable to workers for
violations of the FLSA.17
In 2014, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its Enterprise test in Thompson v.
Real Estate Mortgage Network.18 Additionally, the Thompson court adopted
new FLSA tests with respect to successor and supervisor liability, which will
similarly expand the universe of entities responsible for FLSA violations.19
Thompson extended the FLSA’s reach in the Third Circuit to cover more
employers, a positive development that comports with the text and underlying
policies of the FLSA. 20 Thompson also has important implications in light of
the unprecedented growth in subcontracting and other multi-layered

warehouse-workers-20140515-story.html
[http://perma.cc/ENM6-FCNZ]
(describing
settlement between defendants Walmart and Schneider Logistics and plaintiff-warehouse
workers); see also Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics, Inc., No. CV 11-8557 CAS (DTBx), 2013
WL 140214, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend
complaint to include Walmart as defendant). Walmart argued that it should not be deemed a
joint employer under the Bonnette test, but the judge found this argument “more properly
addressed on a motion to dismiss.” See id. at *5.
15. 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).
16. See generally id. at 469–70 (articulating test for joint employment and
acknowledging that its test is “melding” of Bonnette test from Ninth Circuit and test
developed by Western District of Pennsylvania in Lewis v. Vollmer, No. 05–1632, 2008 WL
355607 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008), which found joint employment only under more limited
circumstances involving only direct control over employment matters in context of Title VII
and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims).
17. See id. at 469 (articulating a standard to determine whether a company is joint
employer under FLSA, considering “1) the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the
relevant employees; 2) the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work rules and
assignments and to set the employees’ conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and
work schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) the alleged employer’s
involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline; and 4) the
alleged employer’s actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes”).
The Enterprise court stressed that this list is not exhaustive and other indicia of significant
control may also be considered. See id.
18. 748 F.3d 142, 148–49 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying Enterprise test to mortgage
underwriter’s claim that two real estate companies were joint employers and thus jointly and
severally liable for FLSA violations she suffered).
19. See id. at 152–54 (adopting broad federal common law standard for successor
liability in context of FLSA claims and extending prior test for supervisor liability under
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to FLSA claims). For a further discussion on both of
these standards, see infra notes 108–30 and accompanying text.
20. Compare, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 815 (1981)
(delineating traditional, narrow New Jersey state law standard for successor liability), with
Thompson, 748 F.3d at 150–52 (delineating and adopting federal common law standard for
successor liability in context of FLSA claims, which extends liability to more successors than
state law standard to further important “employment-related policies”). See also 29 U.S.C. §
202 (2012) (declaring far-reaching United States industrial policy to eliminate burdens and
obstructions to commerce posed by substandard terms and conditions of employment); id. §
203(d) (defining “employer” to include employers exerting indirect control over employees).
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employment relationships because it will subject more of these relationships to
FLSA’s protections.21
Part II of this Casebrief provides background information on the
substantive provisions and policy purposes of the FLSA. 22 Additionally, Part II
traces the development of case law in the Third Circuit regarding the FLSA’s
application to corporations and individuals outside the immediate employment
relationship.23 Part III explores the facts, procedural history, and holding of
Thompson.24 Part IV concludes that Thompson appropriately extended the
FLSA’s reach to subject more employers to liability for wage theft consistent
with the statutory text and underlying policies. 25 Part V provides advice to
practitioners representing employees and employers in the Third Circuit after
Thompson.26 Part VI states a brief conclusion.27
II. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the FLSA in the wake of the Great Depression to
improve labor standards by establishing minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements.28 These policies were intended to spur macroeconomic change
and ensure workers fair pay. 29 Courts have interpreted the FLSA to apply to an
evolving range of “employers” since its enactment, including joint employers,
successors, and individual supervisors. 30

21. See, e.g., CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, WHO’S
BOSS: RESTORING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR LABOR STANDARDS IN OUTSOURCED WORK
19 (2014), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2014/Whos-the-Boss-RestoringAccountability-Labor-Standards-Outsourced-Work-Report.pdf?nocdn=1
[http://perma.cc/27KS-AXLD] (reporting staffing industry “doubl[ed] as a share of overall
employment” during 1990s and in 2013, accounted for 3.4 million jobs or 2.5% of all U.S.
employment); see also Michael Grabell, The Expendables: How the Temps Who Power
Corporate Giants Are Getting Crushed, PROPUBLICA (June 27, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-expendables-how-the-temps-who-power-corporategiants-are-getting-crushe [http://perma.cc/A3FZ-BEK3] (reporting American Staffing
Association estimation that staffing jobs account for up to 10% of all U.S. employment).
22. For a background discussion of the FLSA, see infra notes 31–42 and
accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of Supreme Court and Third Circuit case law on the FLSA’s
definition of employer, see infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text.
24. For a detailed explanation of the Third Circuit’s decision in Thompson, see infra
notes 84–130 and accompanying text.
25. For a critical analysis of the Third Circuit’s holding in Thompson, see infra notes
131–78 and accompanying text.
26. For practical advice for practitioners, see infra notes 182–206 and accompanying
text.
27. For a conclusion of this Casebrief, see infra notes 207–10 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the history of FLSA, see infra notes 31–42 and accompanying
text.
29. For a discussion of FLSA’s industrial policy aims, see infra notes 36–42 and
accompanying text.
30. For a discussion of judicial interpretation of FLSA to apply to various employer
entities, see infra notes 43–83 and accompanying text.
THE
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A. FLSA: Groundbreaking Labor Protections and Far-Reaching
Industrial Policy
The FLSA is a landmark piece of New Deal legislation enacted by
Congress in 1938.31 For the first time, the law established a federal minimum
wage and mandated overtime compensation. 32
The FLSA’s overtime
provisions require employers to pay covered employees “time and a half” for
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. 33 The FLSA provides a
private cause of action to employees who suffer a statutory violation. 34
Employees can recover unpaid compensation in addition to an equivalent
amount in liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. 35
The FLSA not only reflected the New Deal Congress’s determination to
protect workers from “sweatshop” conditions, but also represented
groundbreaking industrial policy calculated to bring about macroeconomic
changes.36 Congress saw the minimum wage as a means of eliminating unfair
business competition rooted in substandard wages. 37 In Congress’s view, that
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (crediting FLSA as enacted on June 25, 1938).
32. See id. §§ 206–212 (establishing minimum wage, maximum hours, and abolishing
child labor). Currently, the minimum wage rate required by FLSA is $7.25 per hour. See id.
§ 206(a) (“Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages . . . not
less than . . . $7.25 an hour . . . .”).
33. See id. § 207(a)(1) (“[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate at which he is employed.”).
34. See id. § 216 (“Any employer who violates the provisions of [the minimum wage
or overtime provisions] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”).
35. See id. (providing courts shall “in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff
or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action”).
36. See Domestic Service Final Rule Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/faq.htm [http://perma.cc/YR7A-A9A4] (last
visited Nov. 25, 2015) (describing Congress’s goals in enacting FLSA: “to provide minimum
wage and overtime protections for workers, to prevent unfair competition among businesses
based on subminimum wages, and to spread employment by requiring employers whose
employees work excessive hours to compensate employees at one-and-one-half times the
regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40”).
37. See 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (calling Congress to
pass legislation “insuring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day’s pay for
a fair day’s work”). President Roosevelt’s message to Congress “served as the inspiration”
for the enactment of the FLSA. See Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 n.8
(1987) (emphasizing importance of presidential message); see also 29 U.S.C. § 202 (declaring
it to be U.S. policy to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of
workers[,]” which “constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce[,]” and has the
effect of “burdening and obstructing commerce”).
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sort of competition harmed more efficient firms that derived their profits from
innovation and superior products or services by permitting inefficient firms to
survive by eroding workers’ wages.38 Additionally, Congress sought to
stimulate growth and support markets for the products of industry by driving up
workers’ wages, and thus their purchasing power as consumers.39
To complement the FLSA’s minimum wage policy, Congress enacted the
overtime compensation requirement for two purposes. 40 Congress sought both
to protect workers from exploitative “overwork” and to reduce
unemployment.41 By making “overwork” costly for employers, Congress
hoped to spread work hours across more employees and thus increase the
employment rate.42
38. See Amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on Educ. & Labor on S. 1349, 79th Cong. 847 (1945) (testimony of Chester
Bowles, Adm’r, Office of Price Admin.) (describing Congress’s rationale for establishing
minimum wage: “[T]he Congress decided that it is against the public interest for business to
operate on the sweat of exploited workers. Any employer so inefficient that he could stay in
business only by paying sweatshop wages—like the employer who could stay in business only
by operating an unsafe plant—was told that he did not belong in business.”); see also Marc
Linder, The Minimum Wage as Industrial Policy: A Forgotten Role, 16 J. LEGIS. 151, 157
(1990) (contending minimum wage promotes “macroeconomic productivity” by “interfering”
with low-wage labor markets that “disguise inefficiency, creating large profit margins that are
due not to efficient production but to extreme exploitation”). Professor Linder further
contends that this results in “forc[ing] out of business” inefficient, “low-productivity” firms
that fail to become efficient or “modernize.” See id. According to Professor Linder, the
minimum wage may also be conceptualized as a corrective for a “market failure.” See id. at
151 (internal quotations omitted). Firms employing workers at substandard wage rates had at
least partially shifted the “minimum social cost of maintaining a worker” onto workers
themselves or the public at large. See id.; see also 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of
Pres. Roosevelt) (“Enlightened business is learning that competition ought not to cause bad
social consequences, which inevitably react upon the profits of business itself.”). The FLSA
forces firms to “internalize” these costs. Linder, supra, at 151.
39. See 81 CONG. REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging Congress to
“take further steps to reduce the lag in the purchasing power of industrial workers and to
strengthen and stabilize the markets for the farmers’ products”); see also 82 CONG. REC. 11
(1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (calling on Congress to pass legislation “to maintain
wage income and the purchasing power of the Nation against recessive factors in the general
industrial situation” including “[t]he exploitation of child labor and the undercutting of wages
and the stretching of the hours of the poorest-paid workers in periods of business recession[,]”
which “have a serious [detrimental] effect on buying power”).
40.
See 81 CONG. REC. 4983–84 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging
Congress to reduce excessive work hours in industry, which President Roosevelt hoped would
spread employment).
41. See id. at 4984 (criticizing practice of “stretching workers’ hours” and “overwork”
and stating “[r]easonable and flexible use of the long-established right of government to set
and to change working hours can, I hope, decrease unemployment in those groups in which
unemployment today principally exists”); see also 82 CONG. REC. 11 (1937) (statement of
Pres. Roosevelt) (urging Congress to “protect workers unable to protect themselves from . . .
excessively long hours”).
42. See Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577–78 (1942) (“By this
[overtime compensation] requirement, although overtime was not flatly prohibited, financial
pressure was applied to spread employment to avoid the extra wage and workers were assured
additional pay to compensate them for the burden of a workweek beyond the hours fixed in
the act. In a period of widespread unemployment and small profits, the economy inherent in
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B. FLSA’s Evolving Reach: Third Circuit and Supreme Court Precedents
Cast a Wide Net in Defining “Employer”
In service of its broad policy agenda, the FLSA expansively defines
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee . . . .”43 This definition of “striking
breadth” looks to the “economic reality” of the employment relationship rather
than “technical concepts.”44 Accordingly, the definition encompasses work
relationships outside the traditional, formalistic conception of the employeremployee relationship.45 Corporate officers, supervisors, and businesses that
directly or indirectly control workers may also fall within the definition,
sometimes simultaneously.46
For example, a company may hire a
subcontractor to provide labor without hiring any of the subcontractor’s

avoiding extra pay was expected to have an appreciable effect in the distribution of available
work. Reduction of hours was a part of the plan from the beginning.”), superseded by statute
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251–262, as stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012).
44. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (basing
holding on propositions that “‘economic reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the
test of employment”); Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 467 (3d Cir. 2012) (characterizing Supreme
Court precedent on FLSA as recognizing definition of employer of “striking breadth” (quoting
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
45. See Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1947) (“[The FLSA]
contains its own definitions, comprehensive enough to require its application to many persons
and working relationships, which prior to [the FLSA], were not deemed to fall within an
employer-employee category.”). Similarly, the FLSA defines “employ” and “employee”
expansively. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), (e)(4)(A), (g) (providing “[t]he term ‘employee’
means any individual employed by an employer[,]” and “‘[e]mploy’ includes to suffer or
permit to work”). “Employ” in FLSA means only to “suffer or permit to work.” See id. A
FLSA “employee” is “any individual employed by an employer.” See id. As the Supreme
Court has observed, it would be difficult to imagine more inclusive definitions of “employ”
and “employee.” See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362–63 (1945) (“A
broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees within the stated categories would be
difficult to frame. The use of the words ‘each’ and ‘any’ to modify ‘employee,’ which in turn
is defined to include ‘any’ employed individual, leaves no doubt as to the Congressional
intention to include all employees within the scope of the [FLSA] unless specifically
excluded.”). Indeed, the Court acknowledged FLSA gave “employer” the “broadest definition
that has ever been included in any one act.” See id. at 363 n.3. So long as a person works for
another, he or she is an employee, regardless of whether or not the employer actively hired or
instructed them; “suffer or permit to work” is all the FLSA requires. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
All employees, no matter how they work or receive payment, are covered unless specifically
excluded. See Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. at 363.
46. See, e.g., Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d 1509, 1514 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding
corporate officers to be employers personally liable for FLSA violations); Bonnette v. Cal.
Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding local public agencies
to be joint employers of homecare workers they provided to eligible recipients by virtue of
agencies’ “considerable control over the structure and conditions of employment,” their
determining tasks and “number of hours” of each chore worker, and their supervision of chore
workers in event of dispute with the recipients), disapproved by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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workers, signing their paychecks, or fixing their wages and benefits.47
However, the client company may be deemed a joint employer if it sets work
schedules, influences pay rates, or monitors workers’ productivity. 48 In the
case of Mr. Rangel presented in Part I, for instance, Walmart arguably did each
of these.49 When determining employer status, courts must always remain
cognizant of the long-established rule that FLSA is to be “liberally
construed.”50 To serve its broad policy agenda, the FLSA also imposes liability
upon successor firms for their predecessors’ violations in some
circumstances.51
1.

Joint Employers: When Two Bosses Call the Shots

Because the FLSA’s conception of employment reaches beyond
immediate, formal employment relationships, it is possible for two or more
entities to be deemed “joint employers” of workers. 52 This is an important
determination because, in addition to violations they commit themselves, joint
employers are also jointly and severally liable for the FLSA violations of other
joint employers.53
In 2012, the Third Circuit articulated its standard for joint employment
under FLSA in Enterprise.54 The Enterprise court blended the Ninth Circuit’s
47. See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642–44 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding
grower was joint employer of farm workers hired by staffing firm when grower set harvest
schedules, inspected work performed, communicated satisfaction with work, and increased
rates to subcontractor for explicit purpose of increasing workers’ pay during a “first picking,”
but did not actually hire workers, pay them, or directly supervise them daily, with court
stressing such indicia of direct control are not essential and that indirect control may suffice to
establish joint employment).
48. See id.
49. See supra notes 2–27 and accompanying text.
50. See Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e
adhere to the firmly-established guidon that the FLSA must be liberally construed to
effectuate Congress’ remedial intent.”), abrogated on other grounds by Reich v. Bay, Inc., 23
F.3d 110 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955)
(recognizing that long history of Supreme Court precedents have given FLSA “liberal
construction” guided by “practical considerations, not by technical conceptions”).
51. See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir.
2013).
52. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“Under the FLSA, multiple persons or entities can be responsible for a single employee’s
wages as ‘joint employers’ in certain situations. One such scenario occurs where both
employers ‘exert significant control’ over the employee, ‘by reason of the fact that one
employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer.’”
(citations omitted)).
53. See id. (explaining liability that arises after a court finds entity to be joint employer
of workers within FLSA’s definition of employer).
54. See Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2012). In Enterprise, the court
examined a case involving assistant managers for Enterprise Holdings’s subsidiaries. See
generally id. The managers asserted Enterprise Holdings was a joint employer along with the
subsidiaries. See id. at 464–65. The Enterprise court looked to the Third Circuit’s NLRB v.
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Penn., Inc. (Browning-Ferris), 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982),
standard as its analysis’s “starting point.” See id. at 468. In 1982, the Third Circuit’s
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Bonnette test with the more restrictive test from Lewis v. Vollmer55 adopted by
the Western District of Pennsylvania. 56 The Lewis test would have effectively
required direct control of employment matters because its factors failed to leave
room for indirect avenues of control as contemplated by the FLSA. 57
Consequently, the Third Circuit refused to adopt Lewis wholesale, finding it too
narrow for the FLSA.58
To better conform Lewis to the FLSA, the Third Circuit adopted aspects of
the Bonnette test into its new standard.59 The result was a blended test,
considering the alleged employer’s:

landmark decision in Browning-Ferris established a test for joint employment under the
NLRA. See Browning-Ferris, 691 F.2d at 1122–23. The Browning-Ferris standard still
guides the National Labor Relations Board’s standard on joint employment relationships
under the NLRA nationwide. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of California, 362 N.L.R.B. No.
186 (Aug. 27, 2015) (“Today, we restate the Board’s joint-employer standard to reaffirm the
standard articulated by the Third Circuit in [the] Browning-Ferris decision. . . . In determining
whether a putative joint employer meets this standard, the initial inquiry is whether there is a
common-law employment relationship with the employees in question. If this common-law
employment relationship exists, the inquiry then turns to whether the putative joint employer
possesses sufficient control over employees’ essential terms and conditions of employment to
permit meaningful collective bargaining.”). According to the Third Circuit in BrowningFerris, two or more entities are joint employers when they “share or co-determine those
matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.” Browning-Ferris, 691
F.2d at 1119, 1123 (finding joint employment of drivers by waste processing facility (BFI)
and truck brokers after consideration of following facts: drivers wore BFI logo on clothing;
brokers and BFI insured trailers; BFI determined drivers’ start times; BFI approved drivers
before hire; BFI directed drivers to perform certain tasks in certain spots; and BFI employee
effectively terminated certain drivers). The Third Circuit in Enterprise noted the BrowningFerris standard is consistent with the standard articulated by the Department of Labor (which
enforces FLSA) regulations, which find joint employment “[w]here the employers are not
completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be
deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one
employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another employer.” See
Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 468 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. No. 05-1632, 2008 WL 355607 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2008).
56. See Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 470 (“Therefore, we hold that the test for ‘joint
employer’ under the FLSA is as we have fashioned it, a melding of the modified Lewis test
and the Bonnette test, consistent with those considerations of the real world where such
additional economic concerns are prominent. We will refer to this test as the Enterprise
test . . . .”). The Lewis test from the Western District considers the following factors when
determining joint employer status: “1) authority to hire and fire employees, promulgate work
rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits,
and hours; 2) day-to-day supervision of employees, including employee discipline; and 3)
control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes and the like.” Lewis, 2008
WL 355607, at *4 (quoting Cella v. Villanova Univ., No. CIV.A 01–7181, 2003 WL 329147,
at *9 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2003), aff’d 113 Fed. App’x 454 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
57. See Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469 (“A simple application of the Lewis test would only
find joint employment where an employer had direct control over the employee, but the FLSA
designates those entities with sufficient indirect control as well. We therefore conclude that
while the factors outlined today in Lewis are instructive they cannot, without amplification,
serve as the test for determining joint employment under the FLSA.”).
58. See id.
59. See id.
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1) authority to hire and fire the relevant employees; 2) authority to
promulgate work rules and assignments and to set the employees’
conditions of employment: compensation, benefits, and work
schedules, including the rate and method of payment; 3) involvement
in day-to-day employee supervision, including employee discipline;
and 4) actual control of employee records, such as payroll, insurance,
or taxes.60

The court stressed this list is not exhaustive and courts may consider other
indicia of control.61
The Enterprise test’s relative breadth is illustrated by its consideration of
any “indicia of ‘significant control’” to show joint employment, and mere
“involvement” in supervision and discipline as opposed to actual supervisory
power.62 “Significance,” however, injects an important limitation: while
indirect or direct control may suffice, such control must be significant. 63 For
example, a parent company’s nonbinding advice to subsidiaries about how to
operate under its brand is something analogous to the suggestions of a “third
party consultant” and insufficient to show joint employment in the Third
Circuit.64 In the final analysis, a joint employment determination “must be
based on a consideration of the total employment situation and the economic
realities of the work relationship.”65
2.

Successors: FLSA Liability as a Hot Potato

Generally, under most states’ laws, successor corporations are “legally
distinct” from their predecessors. 66 Successors only assume the debts or
60. Id. at 469.
61. See id. at 469–70 (stressing Enterprise test is not to be “blindly applied,” and that
“other indicia of significant control” may suffice to establish joint employment “when
incorporated with the individual factors we have set forth,” and in view of “economic realities
of the work relationship” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
62. See id. at 469 (articulating non-exhaustive factors considered in Third Circuit’s
Enterprise test).
63. See id. at 468 (“We conclude that where two or more employers exert significant
control over the same employees—[whether] from the evidence it can be shown that they
share or co-determine those matters governing essential terms and conditions of
employment—they constitute joint employers under the FLSA.” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. See id. at 471 (concluding Enterprise Holdings lacked sufficient authority to be
deemed a joint employer of its subsidiaries’ workers and comparing parent company’s control
to “third-party consultant”).
65. See id. at 469 (quoting Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465,
1470 (9th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding Enterprise Holding not a
joint employer). The Ninth Circuit found that Enterprise Holdings exercised “no control, let
alone significant control.” See id. at 471.
66. Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976)
(articulating general rule that successor corporations are completely distinct from predecessors
and delineating factors which could justify exception rendering successors liable for debts of
predecessors under New Jersey law). In Wilson, a corporate defendant that bought a
predecessor’s assets, assumed its contractual and property liabilities, and maintained its
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liabilities of predecessor entities when (1) the purchasing corporation expressly
or impliedly agreed to assume debts or liabilities, (2) the transaction is
tantamount to a merger of the successor and predecessor, (3) the successor is a
“mere continuation” of the predecessor, (4) the transaction is entered into
fraudulently to escape liabilities, or (5) there was inadequate consideration for
the sale or transfer.67
In recent decades, however, federal courts have developed a broader
standard for successor liability, specifically within the context of employment
claims.68 The federal standard holds more successor entities liable for
predecessor violations than state common law rules in order to further federal
labor policies.69 Under the federal standard, courts may find successors liable
considering merely “(1) continuity in operations and work force of the
successor and predecessor employers; (2) notice to the successor-employer of
its predecessor’s legal obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide
adequate relief directly.”70
The Supreme Court first applied the federal standard to claims under the
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) and the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).71 The NRLA seeks to promote labor peace by guaranteeing
workers full freedom of association and the right to organize into unions and by
imposing upon employers a duty to bargain collectively with those unions. 72 In
personnel was deemed a “continuation” of the predecessor, and thus liable for predecessor
tortious conduct in allegedly producing a defective product. See generally id.
67. See id. Under New Jersey law, a “mere continuation” is established by the
following factors: “continuity of ownership; continuity of management; continuity of
personnel; continuity of physical location, assets and general business operations; and
cessation of the prior business shortly after the new entity is formed,” and “the extent to which
the successor intended to incorporate [the predecessor] into its system with as much the same
structure and operation as possible,” thus determining “whether the purchaser holds itself out
to the world as the effective continuation of the seller.” See Bowen Eng’g v. Estate of Reeve,
799 F. Supp. 467, 487–88 (D.N.J. 1992) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 19 F.3d 642 (3d Cir. 1994). The court stressed this standard
does not require that all factors are present—only some. See id.
68. See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 150 (3d Cir.
2014) (describing “federal common law standard for successor liability that has slowly gained
traction in the field of labor and employment disputes over the course of almost fifty years”).
69. See id. at 150–51 (noting federal standard “presents a lower bar to relief than most
state jurisprudence,” in order to “impos[e] liability upon successors beyond the confines of the
common law rule when necessary to protect important employment-related policies”
(alteration in original) (quoting Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94 (3d
Cir.2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
70. See id. at 150–51 (quoting Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d
173, 178 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 181–85 (1973) (applying
federal common law standard to NLRA claims); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 548–51 (1964) (applying federal common law standard to LMRA claims).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (finding “the denial by some employers of the right of
employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of
collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have
the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce” and declaring it U.S.
policy to eliminate these problems by “encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
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the view of the Court, employees expect that NLRA violations, which disrupt
their associational rights, will be remedied regardless of whether a predecessor
or successor is in charge.73 Further, such remedies may usually be achieved “at
minimal cost” to successor employers. 74 The Court noted that employees and
their unions typically are not involved in corporate negotiations to sell a
business and therefore may be greatly “disadvantage[d].”75 After weighing
companies’ interest in being able to restructure their businesses with
employees’ interest in “some protection . . . from a sudden change in the
employment relationship,” the Court decided to apply the federal standard to
NLRA claims.76
The Third Circuit later extended the federal standard to claims under Title
VII and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), noting the
policy agendas underlying those statutes are similarly broad and justify
application of the standard.77 Finally, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have
extended the federal standard to the FLSA claims as the “logical extension of
existing case law.”78
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of
negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”);
id. § 157 (providing “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection”); id. § 158(a)(5) (providing “[i]t shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees”).
73. See Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 184 (finding “[t]o the extent that the
employees’ legitimate expectation is that the unfair labor practices will be remedied, a
successor’s failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the employees engage in collective
activity to force remedial action[,]” and noting successors may benefit from predecessors’
NLRA violations if employees identify labor policies of successor with those of predecessor
and refrain from protected activities out of fear).
74. See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177 (citing Golden State Bottling Co., 414 U.S. at 168)
(discussing protection for employees’ associational rights and promotion of labor peace are
important goals imposing only minimal costs on successors and noting costs associated with
liability for NLRA violations can be taken into account during corporate purchase
negotiations and may affect purchase price or be covered by indemnity clause).
75. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 376 U.S. at 549.
76. See id.
77. See Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Const. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying
federal common law standard for successor liability to ERISA claims finding that policies
underlying ERISA, protecting pension plan participants and their beneficiaries, “are no less
important, and no less compel the imposition of successor liability than do the policies
animating the NLRA, Title VII, or the other statutes to which the doctrine has been extended”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177–79 (applying federal
common law standard for successor liability to employment discrimination claims under Title
VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, noting similarities between Title VII and NLRA in that both
emphasize protecting and “providing relief for the victims of prohibited practices . . .
sufficient . . . to warrant imposing liability on a corporate successor for Title VII violations of
the predecessor company” (quoting EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d
1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
78. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 151 (3d Cir. 2014).
See generally Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 765–67 (7th Cir.
2013); Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Individuals are personally liable to workers for FLSA violations when they
commit the violations while “acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee.” 79 In Haybarger v. Lawrence County
Adult Probation & Parole 80, the Third Circuit articulated a standard for
individual liability under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), noting
that statute’s close similarity to the FLSA. 81 The court held “an individual is
subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory authority over
the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged
violation’ while acting in the employer’s interest.” 82 Sufficient “supervisory
authority” exists under this standard when a supervisor “independently
exercise[s] control over the work situation.” 83
III. THOMPSON V. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
REAFFIRMS ENTERPRISE AND ADOPTS NEW TESTS ON SUCCESSOR AND
SUPERVISOR LIABILITY
In Thompson, the Third Circuit significantly expanded the FLSA’s reach to
encompass more employment relationships. The court considered a claim by
Patricia Thompson, an employee of one “defunct” business and its successor. 84
Ms. Thompson sued for alleged overtime violations and sought to hold both
entities liable and two co-owners personally liable as supervisors. 85 Vacating
the lower court’s dismissal of Thompson’s claims, the Third Circuit reaffirmed
its test for joint employment established in Enterprise and adopted new tests
with respect to successors’ and supervisors’ liability for FLSA violations. 86

79. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(a), (d) (2012) (defining “person” as “an individual,
partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized
group of persons” and defining “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the
interest of an employer in relation to an employee”).
80. 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012).
81. See id. at 417 (articulating standard for individual liability for FMLA violations).
Under the FMLA, covered employees are entitled to unpaid, job-protected leave for twelve
weeks after the birth of a child, to seek treatment for a serious health condition that renders
them unable to work, or to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition.
See Wage and Hour Division, Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/ [http://perma.cc/5LGH-A73G](last visited Nov. 25, 2015).
82. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417 (quoting Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694
(7th Cir. 1987)) (discussing individual liability under FMLA). The Haybarger court found a
supervisor at a public agency may be liable for allegedly disciplining and discriminating
against an employee for exercising protected FMLA rights. See id. at 419.
83. See id. at 417 (alteration in original) (quoting Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747
F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2014).
85. See id. at 153–54 (detailing allegations against individual supervisors).
86. See generally id. (applying Enterprise factors to alleged joint employment
relationship in Thompson, adopting the federal common law standard for successor liability,
and adopting Haybarger standard for supervisor liability).
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A. Accountability Through a Maze: Thompson’s Factual Background

Security Atlantic Mortgage Company (SA), a “nationwide direct mortgage
lender,” hired Patricia Thompson as a mortgage underwriter in June of 2009.87
Soon after being hired, SA required Thompson to attend a training session led
by an employee of Real Estate Mortgage Network (REMN). 88 The REMN
employee represented that SA and REMN were “sister compan[ies].” 89
In February 2010, Thompson’s superiors instructed her and other
employees to “fill out new job applications to work for REMN.”90 Thompson
complied and then REMN, not SA, began issuing her paychecks. 91 SA went
out of business, and the defendants characterized it as “defunct.” 92 “Virtually
no change” occurred in Thompson’s work environment despite her transfer to
REMN.93 She and other employees continued to do “the same work, at the
same desks, at the same location.”94 Her “pay rate, work email address, and
direct supervisors” did not change. 95 No employees were discharged, but some
“continued to receive paychecks from [SA].”96
Thompson alleged that between being hired by SA in June 2009 and
leaving REMN on August 5, 2010, both employers permitted her “to regularly
work more than eight hours per day and more than forty hours per week without
overtime compensation” in violation of the FLSA. 97 Thompson also sought to
recover against Samuel Lamparello, SA’s co-owner and President, and Noel
Chapman, its co-owner and Executive Vice President.98 According to
Thompson, Lamparello and Chapman “made decisions concerning [both firms’]
day-to-day operations, hiring, firing, promotions, personnel matters, work
schedules, pay policies, and compensation,” including the authority to direct
lower-level supervisors on personnel issues. 99 In June 2010, Thompson asked
Chapman about overtime, and he replied that he “did not pay overtime to
underwriters.”100 The following month, Chapman emailed all employees
thanking them for “long hours, late nights and even weekends” working for the

87. See id. at 145.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 146.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. Thompson further alleged that her employers “uniformly misrepresented”
to her and other employees “that they were exempt, salaried employees and, therefore,
ineligible to receive overtime pay.” See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See id.
99. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“When a work or personnel issue arose
at [SA] or REMN that Thompson’s immediate supervisor could not address alone, the
supervisor would consult with, among others, Chapman or Lamparello.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
100. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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company.101 “In 2011, both Chapman and Lamparello became officers of
REMN.”102 On August 5, 2011, Thompson quit her job at REMN. 103
Thompson sued SA, REMN, Lamparello, and Chapman, seeking “to hold
REMN liable for SA[’s] own statutory violations under theories of joint
[employment] liability and successor liability.”104 Thompson further sought to
hold Lamparello and Chapman “personally, jointly, and severally liable” as
employers “by virtue of their [management] positions” within both firms. 105
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed
Thompson’s complaint without prejudice.106 Thompson appealed the district
court’s holding to the Third Circuit.107
B. Widening the Net: Thompson Holdings on Joint Employers,
Successors, and Supervisors
The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s
claims.108 First, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of
Thompson’s claim based on primary employer liability. 109 The defendants
argued that the lower court’s ruling should be sustained because Thompson
“improperly group[ed] all defendants—individual and corporate—together and
fail[ed] to differentiate between them . . . .’”110 The Third Circuit disagreed,
finding it sufficient that “[t]he pleadings here put the corporate defendants on
fair notice that the alleged violations began during Thompson’s employment”
with SA and continued through her time at REMN. 111
Second, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of Thompson’s joint
employment claim.112 The court recited the factors of the Enterprise test and

101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 146–47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See id. at 147. The district court found Thompson failed to adequately plead a
claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. According to the district court, Thompson
simply alleged an employment relationship without alleging “specific facts connecting her
employment to each named Defendant” as her employers. See Thompson v. Real Estate
Mortg. Network, No. 11–CV–01494 (DMC–JAD), 2011 WL 6935312, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 30,
2011) (“The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is an employee as defined by the FLSA and the
NJWHL, and that each named Defendant is an employer and/or joint-employer within the
meaning of the FLSA and the NJWHL. Plaintiff does not, however, allege any specific facts
connecting her employment to each named Defendant. Without such specific facts, both the
Court and Defendants are unable to determine the extent to which any of the named
Defendants could be liable.”), vacated, 748 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2014).
107. Thompson, 748 F.3d at 147 (noting Thompson “elect[ed] to stand on the
dismissed complaint without further amendment” (citing Hogan v. Rodgers, 570 F.3d 146,
151 (3d Cir. 2009))).
108. See id. at 154.
109. See id. at 148.
110. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 149.
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applied Enterprise to the facts of Thompson.113 According to the Third Circuit,
the district court’s finding that Thompson’s employment at each company was
separate and distinct considered only “the name of the payor appearing on
Thompson’s pay stubs,” which was inconsistent with FLSA’s broader
conception of employment relationships. 114 The court found Thompson’s
required attendance at an REMN training indicated REMN had the “authority to
promulgate work rules and assignments,” the second Enterprise factor, even
before it officially hired Thompson. 115 The REMN employee’s representation
that REMN and SA were “sister compan[ies]” suggested to the court a “broader
degree of corporate intermingling.”116 The court also found the “abrupt[] and
seamless[]” nature of the alleged transfer of all SA employees to REMN
suggested “shared authority over hiring”—the first Enterprise factor.117
Finally, the court cautioned that its “assessment rest[ed] heavily on the [case’s]
procedural posture,” and that a “fully developed factual record” may still
indicate no joint employment existed. 118 The court concluded Thompson
alleged a joint employment relationship that could pass its Enterprise test with
sufficient detail.119
Third, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of
Thompson’s claim against REMN as a successor to SA responsible for its
FLSA liabilities.120 The defendants urged the court to apply the New Jersey
state law standard for determining when a successor corporation is liable for its
predecessor’s liabilities.121 As noted in Part II.B, the state law standard is
significantly less inclusive than the federal common law standard for
employment claims.122 Thompson urged the court to apply the federal
standard, and the court agreed, finding it to be the “logical extension of existing
case law.”123
113. See id. at 148–49 (“We have recently treated [joint employment issues] in some
depth, and in so doing announced a directive that we described as the ‘Enterprise test.’”
(citation omitted)).
114. See id. at 149.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 153.
121. See id. at 150 (noting defendants urged application of New Jersey law on
successor corporations’ liability for predecessor debts and liabilities and reciting state law
standard).
122. For a comparison of the state and federal standards on successor liability, see
supra notes 66–78 and accompanying text.
123. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 150–51. The court quoted and adopted Judge Posner’s
reasoning for applying the federal standard in the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 152 (“We find
[Judge Posner’s] pronouncement well reasoned, directly applicable, and in accord with our
own jurisprudence.”). According to Judge Posner, a more liberal successor standard is applied
to employment claims because the various labor statutes have overarching policy objectives
like “labor peace” (NLRA) or non-discrimination in employment (Title VII). See Teed v.
Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (justifying broader
standard for statutes with broad policy aims). Judge Posner found these statutory goals are
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After adopting the federal standard, the Third Circuit applied it to the facts
of Thompson and found the allegations sufficient to demonstrate that REMN
could be a successor liable for SA’s violations. 124 The court found Thompson
alleged plausible “continuity in operations and work force” because she
“allege[d] that essentially all facets of the business at issue, including
operations, staffing, office space, email addresses, employment conditions, and
work in progress, remained the same after the February 2010 intercession of
REMN.”125 With respect to the third factor, the predecessor’s ability to
compensate victims, the court noted the defendants’ own characterization of SA
as “defunct” and thus unable to pay any damages. 126
Fourth, the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of
Thompson’s claims against Lamparello and Chapman as supervisors. 127 The
court recited its Haybarger standard for personal claims against supervisors for
FMLA violations.128 Applying that standard to Thompson’s FLSA claims, the
court found her allegations contained sufficient information on the “scope of the
[supervisors’] workplace authority . . . .”129 In particular, the court cited
Chapman’s alleged statement “that he ‘did not pay overtime to underwriters’”
and the fact that mid-level supervisors consulted with Lamparello and Chapman
when they could not resolve a personnel issue alone. 130
IV. KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES: THOMPSON’S HOLDINGS COMPORT WITH THE
TEXT AND POLICIES OF FLSA
Thompson liberalized the tests for determining when an entity is an
“employer” and liable for FLSA violations.131 These holdings are consonant

served by a broader standard because “workers will often be unable to head off a corporate
sale by their employer aimed at extinguishing the employer’s liability to them.” See id. Judge
Posner found the FLSA’s goal of protecting workers’ standards of living is just “as fully
deserving of protection” as the goals of other employment statutes. See id. Judge Posner also
argued there is value in “legal predictability” in dealing with successors in the context of
claims made under federal statutes designed to protect employees. See id. at 767 (noting
predictability weighs in favor of applying federal standard given “all the cases” that applied
federal standard to employment claims).
124. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 153 (“In total, then, these allegations are enough to
surmount a motion to dismiss under the federal standard.”).
125. See id. at 152. The court found it was “unclear” whether the federal standard’s
second factor, notice to the successor, was met here. See id. at 153. However, the court found
at this stage in the litigation, Thompson could not be expected to offer “detailed proof” of this
notice given her relatively subordinate position within the company. See id.
126. See id. at 153 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See id. at 154.
128. See id. at 153 (noting “[a]side from the corporate entity itself, a company’s
owners, officers, or supervisory personnel may also constitute ‘joint employers’ for purposes
of liability under the FLSA” and describing its recently articulated standard for such
supervisor claims in context of FMLA).
129. See id. at 154.
130. See id.
131. For a discussion of Thompson’s holdings, see supra notes 84–130 and
accompanying text.
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with FLSA’s broad conception of employment, evidenced by its “employer”
definition.132 Further, these holdings facilitate FLSA’s ambitious policy
purposes.133
A. Thompson Is Consistent with FLSA’s Broad Language
Thompson’s broad tests to determine employer status under FLSA match
the “expansive” statutory definition of employer and its emphasis on “economic
reality” rather than technical concepts. 134 Joint employers can exercise
significant influence over workers’ terms and conditions of employment as a
matter of “economic reality,” even when such influence is not exercised
directly.135 For instance, if a contractor-employer requires its employees to
attend a client-employer’s training and learn its rules, the client-employer is
shaping the rules that govern workers’ conduct. 136 If a client-employer
demands discipline of workers and the contractor-employer complies, workers
face punishment—though indirect—at the command of the client-employer.137
If a client-employer caps the wages of a contractor-employer’s employees, the
client-employer controls the most important employment term through its
contract demands.138 All of these examples of indirect control suggest control
over the work relationship in view of “economic reality.” 139 As such, they
132. For an analysis of Thompson in the context of the FLSA’s statutory language, see
infra notes 134–44 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion of Thompson’s impact on FLSA’s policy purposes, see infra
notes 145–78 and accompanying text.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2012) (defining “employer”). The FLSA “expansive[ly]”
defines “employer” as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer
in relation to an employee[,]” a definition of “striking breadth.” See id.; Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (“While the FLSA, like ERISA, defines an
‘employee’ to include ‘any individual employed by an employer,’ it defines the verb ‘employ’
expansively to mean ‘suffer or permit to work.’ This latter definition, whose striking breadth
we have previously noted, stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who
might not qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”
(citations omitted)).
135. See Hickton v. Enter. Holdings, Inc. (In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour
Emp’t Practices Litig.), 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Because of the uniqueness of the
FLSA, a determination of joint employment ‘must be based on a consideration of the total
employment situation and the economic realities of the work relationship.’ A simple
application of the Lewis test would only find joint employment where an employer had direct
control over the employee, but the FLSA designates those entities with sufficient indirect
control as well.” (citation omitted)).
136. See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir.
2014) (observing joint employment exists when “one employer controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with the other employer” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3) (2015))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
137. See, e.g., Floyd Epperson, 202 N.L.R.B. 23, 23 (1973) (finding joint employment
in NLRA case where contractor-employer requested employee discipline carried out by clientemployer).
138. See, e.g., id. (noting that while client-employer set rates of pay, contractor
employer indirectly influenced those rates by schedule and amount of payments to clientemployer).
139. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1961) (declaring

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/8

18

D'Elia: Keeping FLSA's Promises: The Third Circuit Extends the Law's Reac

2015]

KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES

111

ought to be taken into account and Thompson appropriately facilitates such
consideration.140
This “economic reality” interpretation resonates equally in the context of
individual supervisors that act as FLSA employers. 141 When a supervisor,
pursuing the employer’s interest, violates the FLSA, they do so buttressed by
the economic power of the employer. 142 To the employee, the supervisor
embodies the employer because the supervisor is authorized to act in the
employer’s interest.143 Imposing liability on these actors for the violations they
actually bring about comports with the “economic reality” interpretation of the
FLSA’s definition, because, in a practical sense, they function as employers in
relation to employees.144
B. Thompson’s Tests Serve FLSA’s Broad Policy Agenda
Congress enacted the FLSA not only to protect workers from abusive
employment terms, but also to achieve the industrial policy goals of spreading
employment and increasing consumers’ purchasing power. 145 The Thompson
tests focus on whether employment exists in economic reality, which is
necessary to facilitate a policy calculated to affect nationwide economic

“economic reality” to be “test of employment” under FLSA, and finding such employment in
situation where, though “formal differences” may weigh against finding of employment, real
world economic concerns like pay and disciplinary authority show employment under FLSA
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
140. See generally Thompson, 748 F.3d 142. This interpretation draws additional
support from the Department of Labor’s FLSA regulations, which find employer status
“[w]here the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a
particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or
indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with the other employer.” See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b)(3). The Department’s
emphasis on control is consistent with the “economic reality” standard for evaluating whether
employer status exists: an employee of an employer that is controlled by a second employer
surely may be said to be within the control of the second employer as a matter of economic
reality. See Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 32–33 (outlining “economic reality” standard).
141. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d
Cir. 2012) (finding FLSA test for employment turns on whether “supervisor carried out the
functions of an employer with respect to the employee” (citing Donovan v. Agnew, 712 F.2d
1509, 1510 (1st Cir. 1983))).
142. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
166–67 (1971) (finding statutory definition looks to the “facts involved in the economic
relationship” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
143. See, e.g., Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418–19 (finding supervisor exercised sufficient
control to be deemed employer in analogous FMLA context when he evaluated employee’s
performance, recommended her discharge to her employer, which the employer carried out,
and finding “a jury could reasonably conclude that, but for the substantial authority wielded
by [the supervisor], [the employer] would not have exercised his ultimate authority to fire [the
employee]”).
144. See id. at 419 (finding rational jury could find supervisor was FMLA employer
when he supervised an employee’s work, prepared her performance review, disciplined her,
and retained the authority to fire her).
145. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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conditions.146
The joint employer context illustrates this point. 147 If an immediate
employer of workers is not free to act outside the constraints that a second-level
employer imposes, the latter should have obligations under the FLSA if its
policies are to be realized.148 The FLSA seeks to spread employment by
making “overwork” costly.149 This policy is most workable if FLSA’s
disincentive structure affects all entities that control worker employment. 150
Similarly, the minimum wage provisions of FLSA seek to increase workers’
purchasing power, but they are of little practical relevance if one or more
entities that control the employment relationship may ignore noncompliance
and shift blame to smaller entities with smaller economic footprints.151
Broad “employer” standards are especially necessary given the recent
growth in subcontracting and other multi-layered employment relationships.152

146. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014)
(emphasizing “economic reality” as “the test of employment” and eschewing “technical
concepts” (quoting Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 467–68 (3d Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Linder, supra note 38, at 152 (“Although the minimum wage was
obviously also designed to create micro-welfare effects, its primary function lay in removing
labor costs from competition, increasing productivity macroeconomically by driving
‘parasitic’ firms out of business and concentrating production in the most competent firms,
and in steering capital-labor relations.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
147. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148–49 (explaining “economic reality” is impacted by
the dynamics of control, finding control firms exert on each other in real world factor into
employer analysis).
148. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (agreeing
that Congress enacted FLSA to reduce distribution of goods produced under “subnormal labor
conditions” or to correct “economic evils”); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148,
150–51 (1947) (noting FLSA’s conception of employment was “comprehensive enough to
require its application to many persons and working relationships, which prior to [the FLSA],
were not deemed to fall within an employer-employee category” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The Court in Rutherford Food Corp. concluded this policy agenda justified a legal
test of employment that hinged on “the circumstances of the whole activity.” See id. at 730
(internal quotation marks omitted). One commentator credited Rutherford Food Corp. and
other early FLSA cases with interpreting the law “broadly and to appeal to its underlying
purposes.” See Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2010). Professor Rogers found Rutherford Food Corp. noteworthy
in that it broadly “appealed to the statute’s purposes,” and emphasized that workers were “part
of [an] integrated unit of production.” See id. at 23. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
150. For further discussion on the FLSA’s policy justifications, see supra notes 31–42
and accompanying text.
151. See Rogers, supra note 148, at 23 (“One thus might interpret the Court as having
based its [Rutherford] decision on grounds of policy: if the statute aimed to eradicate the
‘economic evil’ of very low-wage work, it seemed to reason, and if the [second level, clientemployer] enjoyed the power to determine the workers’ wages, then it should be held liable as
their employer.”).
152. See id. at 1 (“In recent decades, responding to the globalization of product and
labor markets, major firms have extended their supply chains and subcontracted many tasks
that do not require skilled labor.”). Professor Rogers argued that while FLSA scholars mostly
support addressing this issue by “liberalizing tests for joint employer liability,” courts would
better effectuate FLSA by imposing a “duty of reasonable care to prevent wage and hour
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In 2013, 3.4 million Americans worked for “staffing” businesses, accounting for
2.5% of all employment in the United States.153 The American Staffing
Association reports an even higher number, stating that one in ten workers are
hired by a staffing business each year. 154 From 2009 to 2013, employment in
the staffing industry increased by 41%, while all other employment grew by just
6%.155 The amount of temporary workers hired through agencies for shortterm employment more than doubled between 1990 and 2008, from 1.1 million
to 2.3 million workers. 156 Multi-layered employment is especially common in
construction and custodial services where 51% and 37% of workers,
respectively, are employed by contractors, rather than the clients receiving the
services.157 Research suggests outsourcing is associated with lower wages and
fewer benefits for employees.158 This renders the joint employment inquiry
under the FLSA especially important as multi-layered employment relationships
proliferate.159
Congress enacted the FLSA to protect workers who occupied vastly
unequal bargaining positions with respect to their employers.160 Workers in
violations within their domestic supply chains.” See id. at 2. Thompson certainly represents
the former approach. See generally Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142
(3d Cir. 2014).
153. See RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., supra note 21, at 19 (reporting number of U.S. jobs in
staffing).
154. See Grabell, supra note 21 (quoting American Staffing Association claim that
staffing jobs account for up to 10% of all U.S. employment).
155. See RUCKELSHAUS ET AL., supra note 21, at 21 (reporting 41% growth in staffing
jobs between August 2009 and 2013).
156. See Tian Luo, Amar Mann & Richard Holden, The Expanding Role of Temporary
Help Services from 1990 to 2008, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 2010, at 3, 3 (charting growth
in temporary help jobs from 1990 to 2008 and finding sector experienced “explosive” growth
between 1990 and 2000).
157. See Annette Bernhardt, Labor Standards and the Reorganization of Work: Gaps
in Data and Research 17 (Inst. for Research on Labor & Emp’t, UC Berkeley Working Paper
No. 100–14, Jan. 2014) (reporting percentages of workers employed by subcontractors in
2012).
158. See Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the
Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 287, 287 (2010) (finding outsourcing is generally associated with lower wages and
fewer benefits for workers and specifically results in a 4% to 7% wage penalty for janitors and
an 8% to 24% wage penalty for guards).
159. See Rogers, supra note 148, at 1 (basing evaluation of FLSA’s protection of
workers on “economy no longer characterized by vertically integrated production”).
160. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (“The legislative
history of the Fair Labor Standards Act shows an intent on the part of Congress to protect
certain groups of the population from substandard wages and excessive hours which
endangered the national health and well-being and the free flow of goods in interstate
commerce. The statute was a recognition of the fact that due to the unequal bargaining power
as between employer and employee, certain segments of the population required federal
compulsory legislation to prevent private contracts on their part which endangered national
health and efficiency and as a result the free movement of goods in interstate commerce. To
accomplish this purpose standards of minimum wages and maximum hours were provided.”
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)); see also Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local
No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944) (finding FLSA and its definition of “employ” are
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subcontracted or other multi-layered employment relationships are likely to earn
low wages and have very little bargaining power. 161 Subjecting outsourcing
employers to the FLSA’s protections serves the law’s goals by ensuring that
even employees with an intermediary employer enjoy the law’s protections. 162
Employers may argue that this imposes unjust costs on outsourcers for
violations they did not commit.163 However, the Enterprise test still requires
active participation or influence of some kind on the part of the employer
(including the ability to set rules, make hiring decisions, and the like). 164 In
this regard, Enterprise is arguably under-inclusive if “economic reality” is to be
the guiding principle; Enterprise fails to encompass some employers that take
no active role in the employment relationship, yet still hold sway over terms and
conditions of employment in view of “economic reality.” 165 For example,
companies at the purchasing end of a supply chain (to which Enterprise likely
would not apply) may be uniquely capable of demanding compliance of
employers down the supply chain via contractual provisions and monitoring. 166
“remedial and humanitarian in purpose”); id. (“We are not here dealing with mere chattels or
articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of
their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others. Those are the rights that Congress
has specially legislated to protect. Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a
narrow, grudging manner.”), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 251–262, as stated in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014).
161. See Dube & Kaplan, supra note 158, at 287.
162. See 81 CONG. REC. 4983–84 (1937) (statement of Pres. Roosevelt) (urging
Congress, in address that inspired FLSA, to pass a law “insuring to all our able-bodied
working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work” (emphasis added)).
163. See, e.g., John P. McAdams & Michael A. Shafir, Parent Company Liability
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 25 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 16, 17 (2006) (arguing
Department of Labor’s understanding of joint employment, which Enterprise court relied on,
should be changed because it “is causing increased legal exposure for corporations with
subsidiary operations, because parent entities are being named as FLSA defendants even
though they have no relationship with the employee bringing suit,” and taking issue with
Department’s consideration of control exerted over other employers, arguing “[t]he true test of
liability for a parent corporation under joint employment law should be whether it exerts
control over the complaining employee(s), not whether it controls the purportedly offending
subsidiary.”).
164. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (delineating Third Circuit’s Enterprise
test for joint employment under FLSA).
165. For further discussion on the bounds of the Enterprise test, see supra notes 52–65
and accompanying text.
166. See Rogers, supra note 148, at 46–47 (arguing for even broader joint employer
liability standard than tests akin to Enterprise/Thompson). Professor Rogers’s proposed
standard would impose a “duty of reasonable care” to prevent foreseeable FLSA breaches
down a company’s supply chain, regardless of whether a “contractual relationship with the
primary wrongdoer” exists. See id. at 2. Professor Rogers argues, “violations are arguably
foreseeable whenever one enters into a contract for goods or services in an industry with a
well-publicized history of violations . . . . They are acutely foreseeable if a firm plays one
contractor or supplier off against another to lower prices, is a frequent purchaser of such
goods or services, enters into a contract that does not include sufficient funding for minimum
wages to be paid, and/or could but does not take reasonable steps to deter or prevent such
violations. In other words, when a firm engages in such a course of action it is not a mere
bystander, but rather is helping to create or heighten the risk—or even the near-certainty—of
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The FLSA’s practical impact would be similarly diluted if employers could
evade their responsibilities under the law by handing their business off to a new
entity, even one with the same top personnel, with no responsibility to
compensate wronged workers. 167 Opponents of the federal standard Thompson
adopted may argue its broad standard unduly burdens successor corporations by
forcing them to pay the cost of the predecessor’s violations. 168 However, as
Judge Posner pointed out in Teed, this is a weak argument.169 Judge Posner
explained, “The successor will have been compensated for bearing the liabilities
by paying less for the assets it’s buying; it will have paid less because the net
value of the assets will have been diminished by the associated liabilities.” 170
Judge Posner also appropriately pointed out there is an interest in uniformity,
and if the goals of other statutes warrant a broader federal successor standard,
so should the equally important purposes of the FLSA. 171 Moreover, Judge
Posner and Thompson’s concern that employers could “extinguish” workers’
FLSA rights by transferring a firm to a successor company resonates with the
Supreme Court’s application of the federal standard to NLRA claims. 172

noncompliance. It therefore seems fair to hold it liable for that harm.” See id. at 46–47.
Although the Enterprise test fails to erect such a scheme, its “catchall” factor may partially
address Rogers’s concerns. See Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 469–70 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]his list
is not exhaustive, and cannot be blindly applied as the sole considerations necessary to
determine joint employment. If a court concludes that other indicia of significant control are
present to suggest that a given employer was a joint employer of an employee, that
determination may be persuasive, when incorporated with the individual factors we have set
forth.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It must be noted, however, as
Professor Rogers stresses, that courts have often fallen short in the “implementation” of
similar control language to the detriment of aggrieved workers. See Rogers, supra note 148,
at 1.
167. See Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir.
2013) (“In the absence of successor liability, a violator of the [FLSA] could escape liability,
or at least make relief much more difficult to obtain, by selling its assets without an
assumption of liabilities by the buyer (for such an assumption would reduce the purchase price
by imposing a cost on the buyer) and then dissolving.”).
168. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant at 16, Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power
Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2440), 2012 WL 6127031, at *16
(arguing against application of federal common law successor standard to FLSA claims,
emphasizing that FLSA “focuses its impact on an existing employment relationship,” and
arguing none of FLSA’s policy objectives are served by “requiring a bona fide successor to
compensate a predecessor employer’s former workers for unpaid wages”).
169. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766–67 (pointing out that liability for FLSA violations will
affect predecessor firms’ purchase prices).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 767.
172. Compare Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 (1973) (finding
that “[t]o the extent that the employees’ legitimate expectation is that the unfair labor practices
will be remedied, a successor’s failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the employees
engage in collective activity to force remedial action,” and noting successors may benefit from
predecessors’ NLRA violations if employees identify labor policies of successor with those of
predecessor and refrain from protected activities out of fear), with Teed, 711 F.3d at 766
(“[W]orkers will often be unable to head off a corporate sale by their employer aimed at
extinguishing the employer’s liability to them.”).
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Workers are no more capable of avoiding a sale calculated to deny their FLSA
rights than one “extinguish[ing]” their associational rights. 173
Additionally, the FMLA’s policy goal of ensuring workers job-protected
leave in the event of a birth or medical condition is no more important than
FLSA’s protections against abusive employment terms.174 FLSA’s protections
are arguably even more impactful upon workers’ interests in that they
constantly govern the most important term (payment) of the employment
relationship, not how that relationship must adapt to specific eventualities. 175 If
broadening the employer standard to certain supervisors is necessary to
effectuate the FMLA, it is just as essential to FLSA, where supervisors act as
the face of the employer with respect to wage violations by, for example,
refusing to pay overtime. 176 Extending FLSA’s scheme of incentives and
disincentives to supervisors to achieve compliance serves the law’s broad
agenda.177 Accordingly, Thompson’s adoption of the Haybarger FMLA
standard for supervisor liability comports with FLSA’s equally expansive policy
agenda.178

173. See Teed, 711 F.3d at 766 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding FLSA’s
policy purposes were “as fully deserving of protection as the labor peace, anti-discrimination,
and worker security policies underlying the NLRA, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, ERISA, and
MPPAA.” (quoting Steinbach v. Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 745 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
174. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014)
(finding Third Circuit’s holding in Haybarger applied in “analogous context” of FMLA
claims). Indeed, the Third Circuit in Haybarger observed “that Congress, in drafting the
FMLA, chose to make the definition of ‘employer’ materially identical to that in the FLSA
means that decisions interpreting the FLSA offer the best guidance for construing the term
‘employer’ as it is used in the FMLA.” See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. &
Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Modica v. Taylor, 465
F.3d 174, 186 (5th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2012) (establishing minimum wage rates and
overtime compensation requirements applicable to most employees), with id. § 2612(a)(1)
(ensuring twelve work weeks of job-protected leave per year for covered employees because
of child’s birth, employee’s serious health condition, or to care for close relative’s serious
health condition, among other reasons).
176. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 417 (holding FMLA “permits individual liability
against supervisors at public agencies” given FLSA’s express definition of “employer”
including “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to
an employee and includes a public agency,” and FMLA’s “materially identical” definition
(quoting Modica, 465 F.3d at 186) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
177. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947) (agreeing with
lower court that FLSA seeks to “correct[] [] economic evils through remedies which were
unknown at common law” and that “underlying economic realities” should establish
employment, finding employment where employees’ work is “a part of the integrated unit of
production,” if not technically part of established employment relationship (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
178. For a discussion of the policy agendas and “materially identical” definition of
“employer” in FLSA and FMLA, see supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/8

24

D'Elia: Keeping FLSA's Promises: The Third Circuit Extends the Law's Reac

2015]

KEEPING FLSA’S PROMISES

117

V. ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS: HANDLING FLSA CLAIMS AFTER THOMPSON
Thompson’s tests expand the universe of potential FLSA-employer
defendants.179 Accordingly, attorneys for employee-plaintiffs will argue
Thompson renders multiple entities liable for FLSA violations. 180 Conversely,
defense attorneys will argue that their clients’ connections to workers or
violations are too tenuous to render them employers. 181
A. After Thompson, Employee–Side Attorneys Will Argue That Putative
Employers Exercise Sufficient Control
On the joint employer front, plaintiffs’ attorneys will want to stress the
interconnectivity of immediate employers and indirect employers with respect
to employment matters.182
Evidence like a putative joint employer’s
recommendations to an immediate employer regarding hiring, promotion,
discipline, discharge, and the like will be probative to establish sway over hiring
and discipline authority, the first and third Enterprise factors.183 Evidence of
control over the parameters of the work relationship, such as dictating workers’
schedules, tasks, and rules, helps establish the second Enterprise factor.184 Mr.
Rangel’s working conditions, described in Part I, provide an illustrative
example.185 In addition to the delineated factors, plaintiffs’ attorneys should
stress any outside indicia of control showing employment in “economic reality,”
for instance, if one employer’s “hands were tied” because it was controlled by
another employer.186

179. For a discussion of Thompson’s holdings, see supra notes 84–130 and
accompanying text.
180. For advice for employee-side attorneys, see infra notes 182–96 and accompanying
text.
181. For advice for employer-side attorneys, see infra notes 197–206 and
accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir.
2014) (stressing, in joint employment determination, “[t]he employee responsible for
Thompson’s training allegedly described REMN as [SA]’s ‘sister company,’ a term which
suggests some broader degree of corporate intermingling.” (emphasis added)).
183. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he scenario described by Thompson, in which she and virtually
all other [SA] employees were abruptly and seamlessly integrated into REMN’s commercial
mortgage business while some of those same employees continued to be paid by [SA],
supports Thompson’s claim that the two companies shared authority over hiring and firing
practices.”).
184. See, e.g., id. (“[A]n employee of REMN conducted Thompson’s training
immediately after she was hired by [SA] in June 2009, indicating that REMN had at least
some authority to ‘promulgate work rules and assignments’ even before REMN formally
hired Thompson . . . .” (emphasis added)).
185. See supra notes 2–28 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Thompson, 748 F.3d at 148 (relying on Department of Labor’s
conception of joint employment, holding joint employment exists where multiple employers
“exert significant control” over workers “by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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With respect to successors, plaintiffs’ attorneys will want to demonstrate
that, though a transition occurred, workers’ conditions remained the same. 187
Crucially, “continuity in operations” is considered as well as notice of FLSA
violations and the predecessor’s ability to pay. 188 Thompson’s facts provide a
useful example: although the plaintiff’s paychecks were signed by a different
payor, none of the workplace operations changed.189 Workers did the same
work at the same stations.190 Furthermore, the predecessor was “defunct” and
therefore unable to pay. 191 Attorneys should mine the facts of their cases to
draw parallels to this sort of scenario.192
Finally, employee-side attorneys will want to establish that when
supervisors were directly involved in conduct running afoul of FLSA, they were
responsible for the statutory violation.193 Further, to be liable, the supervisors
must have acted within the employer’s interest when the FLSA violation
occurred.194 Here, Haybarger’s facts are instructive: a supervisor expressly
recommended an allegedly unlawful discharge as “in the best interest of the
[employer’s] overall operations.”195 Evidence establishing a FLSA violation
under similar circumstances will go a long way towards holding supervisors
responsible as employers for wage and hour violations. 196
B. Employer-Side Attorneys Will Argue That Their Corporate and
Individual Clients Lack Sufficient Control over Workers
On joint employment, employer-side attorneys will seek to minimize the

187. See id. at 151 (considering “continuity in operations and work force of the
successor and predecessor employers” to determine liability, abandoning state law factor of
express or implied adoption of liabilities by successor).
188. See id. (considering continuity in addition to “notice to the successor-employer of
its predecessor’s legal obligation” and “ability of the predecessor to provide adequate relief
directly” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. See id. at 145–46 (“Despite Thompson’s transfer to REMN, virtually no change
occurred in on-site operations. Thompson and her colleagues continued to do the same work,
at the same desks, at the same location. Thompson’s pay rate, work email address, and direct
supervisors remained the same. Thompson alleges that no employees were laid off during this
transition, although some of her colleagues continued to receive paychecks from [SA].”).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 153 (“[D]efendants have represented that [SA] is now ‘defunct,’ which
we take to mean that it is likely incapable of satisfying any award of damages to Thompson.”).
192. See id.
193. See Haybarger v. Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d
Cir. 2012) (crafting test for supervisor liability under FMLA, which Thompson court applied
to FLSA: “an individual is subject to FMLA liability when he or she exercises ‘supervisory
authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged
violation’ while acting in the employer’s interest” (citing Riodran v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d
690, 694 (7th Cir. 1987))).
194. See id.
195. See Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418 (emphasis added).
196. See Thompson, 748 F.3d at 154 (noting supervisor’s alleged statement and
authority to address personnel issues that mid-level supervisors could not established
sufficient control to be deemed FLSA employer).
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“degree of corporate intermingling” between putative joint employers and
immediate employers.197 These attorneys will argue that all control over the
terms and conditions of workers’ employment rests with the immediate
employer.198 They will argue, whenever possible, that defendants have no
control—or even knowledge—over personnel decisions and that the defendants
do not involve themselves in employee discipline. 199 While some control of
the rules and schedules governing workers may be unavoidable, putative joint
employers seeking to avoid that designation will argue that they simply set
broad and general parameters that the immediate employer was free to meet any
way it chose, and assigned workers only according to its own policies. 200
Successor defendants will stress that a complete break occurred when the
firm changed hands.201 Any evidence that supports the absence of continuity
will be useful to show the new business is not a continuation, but simply a firm
that had the misfortune of purchasing all or parts of a business without knowing
about any FLSA violations.202 These defendants will also argue that, although
the predecessor no longer controls the business, it is still capable of
compensating workers for its own wrongs, in which the successor was
uninvolved.203
Supervisors’ attorneys will seek to minimize the supervisor’s role in
precipitating FLSA violations.204 While a violation may have occurred, these
197. See id. at 149.
198. See, e.g., Enterprise, 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding plaintiff failed to
show joint employment to pass its newly enunciated joint employment test because putative
joint employer “exercised no control, let alone significant control, over the [employees]”).
199. See id.
200. See id. (finding putative joint employer had “no authority to promulgate work
rules or assignments, and no authority to set . . . schedules,” and while plaintiffs argued
putative joint employer’s “guidelines and manuals” to subsidiaries made it hold these roles
“functionally,” the court found this unpersuasive, noting putative joint employer’s “suggested
policies and practices [were] entirely discretionary on the part of the subsidiaries,” and that
putative joint employer held “no more authority over the conditions of the assistant managers’
employment than would a third-party consultant who made suggestions for improvements to
the subsidiaries’ business practices”).
201. See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, 711 F.3d 763, 768 (7th Cir.
2013) (“[I]f [a firm’s] assets had been sold piecemeal there is no successor liability, because
of the lack of continuity between predecessor and successor; for when a company is broken up
and its assets sold piecemeal, there is no successor to transfer the company’s liability to. But
to allow [a firm] to acquire assets without their associated liabilities, thus stiffing workers who
have valid claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, is equally a ‘windfall.’” (emphasis
added)).
202. See id. (stressing “lack of continuity” between predecessors and successors when
deciding whether to impose liability and finding where continuity is present, it would be
inequitable to allow workers to go uncompensated for FLSA violations).
203. See id. at 766 (considering “[w]hether the predecessor could have provided relief
after the sale,” as factor weighing in favor of workers’ interests because it considers likelihood
they will be made whole in reality).
204. See Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2014)
(requiring supervisors be “responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation” in order to
impose liability (emphasis added) (quoting Riodran v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th Cir.
1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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attorneys will want to show the supervisor was not actually the driving force
behind the violation, and that some other player in the work relationship is
responsible instead.205 Companies seeking to deflect responsibility for
supervisors’ conduct will argue the supervisor was acting to serve an
unsanctioned, personal interest that was unrelated to the employer’s
interests.206
VI. CONCLUSION
Thompson expanded the reach of the FLSA in the Third Circuit to
encompass “joint employers” with indirect control over workers, more
successors under a relaxed standard, and individual supervisors so long as they
are directly responsible for the violations themselves. 207 This development
comports with FLSA’s expansive language and policy agenda, which were
intended to apply to a wide array of employment relationships to raise labor
standards and reduce unemployment. 208 This decision is especially relevant in
today’s economy, where a growing percentage of work relationships are
structured with multiple levels of businesses controlling workers’ terms and
conditions of employment.209 However, the true test of Thompson’s progress
will be whether courts adhere to its liberalized standards or instead look for
escape routes in the facts of future cases. 210

205. See id.
206. See id. (requiring supervisors to have committed FLSA violations “while acting in
the employer’s interest” in order to impose liability (emphasis added)).
207. For a discussion of Thompson’s confirmation of Enterprise and additional tests on
successor and supervisor liability, all of which will liberalize the test for employment, see
supra notes 84–130 and accompanying text.
208. For a discussion of FLSA’s underlying policies, see supra notes 31–42 and
accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the increasing prevalence of multi-layered employment
relationships, see supra notes 152–59 and accompanying text.
210. See Rogers, supra note 148, at 1 (noting FLSA scholars have mostly endorsed
liberalized tests like Thompson, while noting courts have often fallen short on
“implementation”).
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